Join us in this episode as we explore the rise of AI technology and the complex decisions that policy makers are facing regarding the protection of privacy and fostering of innovation. Our guest Keith sheds light on how moderately loosening regulations in a competitive market environment may maximize consumer welfare. However, we also discuss how some countries, such as Russia, strongly deviate from this strategy, indicating that consumer welfare may not be their top priority.

Keith Chan is Assistant Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, where his research is centered on Microeconomics, Environmental Economics and Sustainable and Green Finance.

You can find his paper on the tradeoff between regulations and innovation for AI here.

In this episode Felix Mylius shares his insights on personal referrals in labour markets. He explains to us why personal referrals are still relevant for job search today despite the predominant use of online platforms to find jobs and how all this is linked to Game Theory and matching markets. Together we dive into firms’ incentives, implications for search platforms and discuss whether this is transferable to other matching markets, like the dating market.

Felix Mylius is currently finishing his PhD in economics at the University of Cambridge. His research is mainly focused on applications of microeconomics within the field of matching markets.

In this episode we are diving into the topic of healthcare markets together with Simon Reif. He explains to us what makes the healthcare market so special, why its characteristics call for regulation and how systems differ substantially across countries. Focusing on Europe we discuss how, counterintuitively, setting a “global budget” for hospitals leads to poorer service and how generating the right incentives could change the healthcare market for the better in future.

Simon Reif is a health economist heading the research group “Health Markets and Health Policy” at the Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. His research is focused on market structures, reimbursement and digitalization of health care provision.

In this episode Piotr Dworczak explains to us how Market Design can contribute to alleviating inequality by increasing accuracy of policies targeting inequality. He does so using an example from the housing market which shows that more often than not it is very difficult to ensure that subsidies actually reach people in need since they cannot be easily identified. This is where Market Design comes into play: by generating targeted incentives which have a selection effect, it makes e.g. affordable housing policies more effective.

Piotr Dworczak is associate Professor at the Department of Economics at Northwestern University and Researcher at the Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE) in Warsaw, Poland. He does research on Mechanism and Information Design, specifically with more applied interests in inequality-aware Market Design.

In this episode Emir Kamenica introduces us to the research field of information design. He recaps the history of modelling information in economics from the 70s to today, and explains term “Bayesian Persuasion” (and if and how it differs from the term “information design”). He then illustrates how having full information e.g. as a navigation app user can lead to inefficient outcomes and what information design means in the context of mystery novels, gambling and entertainment in general.

Emir Kamenica is Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and, together with his co-researchers, has founded the field of Bayesian persuasion. Beyond that his research is centered on different topics in microeconomics.

During the interview, Emir mentions one of his papers on how information design can reduce congestion. You can find this paper here.

In this episode, Vitali Gretschko sheds some light on a fundamental game theoretic concept: Commitment. He explains why commitment is a crucial prerequisite of auctions and introduces different ways of generating commitment.

We also explore how commitment is linked to the concept of information and discuss auction concepts which make it less likely for the auctioneer to break their commitment afterwards.

Vitali Gretschko is Professor of Market Design at the University of Mannheim and head of the ZEW Research Department “Market Design”.

In the interview, Vitali mentions papers explaining how to use cryptography to create commitment in mechanism designs. You can find them here and here.